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e fair division of resources among strategic agents is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich
body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist mechanisms that
can implement fair outcomes, despite the agents’ strategic behavior. A fundamental objective function used
for measuring the fairness of an allocation is the geometric mean of the agents’ values, known as the Nash
social welfare (NSW). is objective function is maximized by widely known solution concepts such as Nash
bargaining and the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes.
In this work we focus on the question of (approximately) implementing this objective. e starting point
of our analysis is the Fisher market, a fundamental model of an economy, whose benchmark is precisely the
(weighted) Nash social welfare. We begin by studying two extreme classes of valuations functions, namely
perfect substitutes and perfect complements, and nd that for perfect substitutes, the Fisher market mecha-
nism yields a constant approximation: at most 2 and at least e
1
e (≈ 1.44). However, for perfect complements,
the Fisher market mechanism does not work well, its bound degrading linearly with the number of players.
Strikingly, the Trading Post mechanism—an indirect market mechanism also known as the Shapley-Shubik
game—has signicantly beer performance than the Fisher market on its own benchmark. Not only does
Trading Post achieve an approximation of 2 for perfect substitutes, but this bound holds for any concave
utilities, and it becomes essentially optimal for perfect complements, where it reaches (1 + ϵ) for any ϵ > 0.
Moreover, we show that all the Nash equilibria of the Trading Post mechanism are pure (hence the approx-
imation factors extend to all Nash equilibria), and satisfy an important notion of individual fairness known
as proportionality.
1 INTRODUCTION
e question of allocating resources among multiple participants in a way that is fair is as old as
human society itself [Moulin, 2003], with some of the earliest recorded instances dating back to
more than 2500 years ago1. e mathematical study of fair division began with the work of Stein-
haus during the second world war, which led to an extensive and growing body of work on fair
division protocols within economics and political science, e.g., [Barbanel, 2004, Brams and Taylor,
1996, Moulin, 2003, Robertson and Webb, 1998, Young, 1995]. Recent years have seen an increased
amount of work on fair division coming from computer science (see, e.g., [Brandt et al., 2016, Part
II]), partly motivated by problems related to allocating computational resources—such as CPU,
memory, and bandwidth—among the users of a computing system. is work has focused on set-
tings with both divisible goods (e.g., [Braˆnzei et al., 2016, Braˆnzei and Miltersen, 2015, Chen et al.,
2013, Cole et al., 2013a, Parkes et al., 2012, Procaccia, 2013]) and indivisible ones (e.g., Procaccia
andWang [2014], Chakrabarty, Chuzhoy, and Khanna [2009], Cole and Gkatzelis [2015], Aziz and
Mackenzie [2016]).
One of the basic questions underlying the fair division problem is that of dening fairness to
begin with, and a large body of work in economics, particularly social choice theory, is concerned
with this very question, with numerous solution concepts proposed in response. Our fairness con-
cept of choice herein is the Nash social welfare (NSW), which dates back to the ies [Nash, 1950]
(also [Kaneko and Nakamura, 1979]) and has been proposed by Nash as a solution for bargaining
problems, using an axiomatic approach. is objective aims to choose an outcome x maximizing
1See, e.g., Hesiod’s eogony, where a protocol known as Cut and Choose is mentioned.
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the geometric mean of the utilities (ui (x)) of the n participating agents and, like other standard
welfare objectives, it is captured by a family of functions known as generalized (power) means:
Mp (x) =
(
1
n
∑
i
[ui (x)]
p
)1/p
.
In particular, the NSW corresponds toM0(x), the limit ofMp (x) as p goes to zero, i.e., (Πiui (x))
1
n .
While an extended treatment of the NSW can be found, for example, in [Moulin, 2003], we high-
light a fundamental property of the NSW objective, namely that it achieves a natural compromise
between individual fairness and eciency. Two other well-studied functions captured byMp (x) are
the (i) egalitarian (max-min) objective aained as p → −∞, and (ii) utilitarian (average) objec-
tive aained at p = 1, which correspond to extreme fairness and extreme eciency, respectively.
However, the former may cause vast ineciencies, while the laer can completely neglect how
unhappy some agents might be. e NSW objective lies between these two extremes and strikes
a natural balance between them, since maximizing the geometric mean leads to more balanced
valuations, but without neglecting eciency.
e highly desired fairness and eciency trade-o that the NSW objective provides can be ver-
ied via its close connection with market equilibrium outcomes in the Fisher market model—one
of the fundamental resource allocation models in mathematical economics. is model was devel-
oped by Fisher [Brainard and Scarf, 2000] and studied in an extensive body of literature [Chen et al.,
2004, Codenoi and Vardarajan, 2004, Devanur et al., 2008, Eaves, 1976, Eisenberg and Gale, 1959,
Gale, 1960, 1976, Garg et al., 2004, Jain et al., 2005, Orlin, 2010]. e basic seing involves a seller
who brings multiple divisible goods to the market and a set of buyers equipped with monetary
endowments (budgets). e goal of the seller is to extract as much money as possible from the
buyers, by charging money for the goods (through prices), while each buyer aims to acquire the
best possible bundle of goods at the given prices. A market equilibrium is an outcome where sup-
ply meets demand, and has been shown to exist for very general models of an economy. When
the buyers have the same budgets, this outcome is known as a competitive equilibrium from equal
incomes (CEEI) [Varian, 1974]. For a broad family of valuations, including the ones considered in
this paper, the market equilibrium allocation is known to maximize the NSW objective when the
budgets are equal. In other words, the seller’s goal can be achieved by computing the allocation
of the goods that maximizes the NSW which, in turn, implies the desired price for each good.
A fundamental problem in implementing the Nash social welfare objective is informational: the
seller needs to know the valuations of the participants. When these valuations are private infor-
mation of the buyers, a natural candidate is the mechanism induced by the Fisher market, known
as the Fisher market mechanism: ask the buyers to report their valuations, and then compute the
NSW maximizing allocation based on the reports. Unfortunately, it is well known that buyers
can feign dierent interests and eventually get beer allocations [Adsul et al., 2010, Babaio et al.,
2014, Braˆnzei et al., 2014, Chen et al., 2012, 2011]. is strategic behavior can result in the mech-
anism computing market equilibria with respect to preferences having lile to do with reality,
leading to unfair allocations. In this work we address the following basic question:
How well does the Fisher market mechanism optimize its own objective—the Nash
social welfare—when the participants are strategic? Are there beer mechanisms?
is question falls under the general umbrella of implementation theory [Dasgupta et al., 1979],
and particularly, of implementing markets [Bevia et al., 2003, Dubey and Shubik, 1978, Giraud,
2003, Nakamura, 1990, Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1986]. In this literature, the goal is to identify
mechanisms (game forms) for which the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of market
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equilibrium allocations for every possible state of the world [Dasgupta et al., 1979]. In general this
can be achieved only in the limit, as the number of players goes to innity and every player is
innitesimal compared to the entire economy [Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2003].
In this work we show that even for small markets there exist classic mechanisms achieving out-
comes that closely approximate the optimal NSW on every instance while simultaneously guar-
anteeing individual fairness. We measure the quality of a mechanism using the Price of Anarchy
(PoA) [Nisan et al., 2007], dened as the ratio between the optimal NSW and the NSW of the worst
Nash equilibrium outcome obtained by the mechanism.
1.1 Our Results
We study the question of approximately implementing the NSW objective starting with two exten-
sively studied classes of valuations, namely linear (or additive) and Leontief ([Nisan et al., 2007],
[Gale, 1960], [Codenoi and Vardarajan, 2004]), two extremes, and generalize many of our results
to arbitrary concave valuations. Recall that additive valuations capture goods that are perfect sub-
stitutes, i.e., that can replace each other in consumption, such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola. Leontief
valuations capture perfect complements, i.e., goods that have no value without each other, such as
le and right shoes.
In addition to the aggregate measure of wealth captured through the Nash welfare, we will
analyze mechanisms that guarantee proportionality, one of the fundamental fairness notions in
fair division. Proportionality requires that every agent i gets at least a fraction Bi/B of its utility
for everything, where Bi is its budget and B the sum of all budgets.
Our rst set of results concerns the Fisher market mechanism, which collects the bidders valu-
ations in the form of bids and then computes the market equilibrium based on those bids:
Theorem (informal) Any Nash equilibrium of the Fisher market mechanism approximate the optimal
Nash social welfare within a factor of 2 for linear valuations. For Leontief valuations, the approxi-
mation degrades linearly with the number of players. Every Nash equilibrium of the mechanism is
proportional for all concave valuations.
ese bounds reveal signicant dierences between the quality of the Nash equilibria of the
Fisher market mechanism for complements and substitutes.
Much more strikingly, we nd that a classic mechanism known as Trading Post, originally in-
troduced by Shapley and Shubik [Shapley and Shubik, 1977] and studied in a long line of work in
dierent scenarios [Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2003, Jackson and Peck, 1999, Korpeoglu and Spear,
2015, Mertens and (eds), 2013], oers very strong guarantees. At a high level, rather than collect-
ing the players’ preferences and computing the market equilibrium, the Trading Post mechanism
gives each participant direct control over how to spend its budget. Once the agents choose how
to distribute their budget over the available goods, they receive a fraction from each good that is
proportional to the amount they spent on it. Our results for the Trading Post mechanism are:
Theorem (informal) Any Nash equilibrium of the Trading Post mechanism approximates the optimal
Nash social welfare within a factor of 2 for all concave valuations. For Leontief valuations, the Trading
Post mechanism achieves in the equilibrium an approximation of 1 + ϵ for every ϵ > 0. Moreover,
all the Nash equilibria of Trading Post are pure for all concave valuations, proportional when the
valuations are concave and increasing, and their existence is guaranteed for all CES valuations.
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In other words, not only does the Trading Post mechanism achieve the same approximation
as the Fisher market mechanism for additive valuations, but the bound holds for all concave val-
uations, and is arbitrarily close to the optimum for Leontief valuations! We view this as an im-
portant result that testies to the usefulness and robustness of the Trading Post mechanism. A
good Nash welfare approximation implies the geometric mean of values is high, and so utility is
well distributed across the participants. Trading Post also ensures proportionality in any equilib-
rium outcome, thus the mechanism guarantees a surprising combination of both individual and
aggregate fairness for very general utilities.
An interpretation of the Leontief result is that the Trading Post mechanism limits the extent to
which an agent can aect the outcome, thus also limiting the extent to which things can go awry.
Specically, when an agent deviates in the Trading Post mechanism, this deviation has no eect on
the way that the other agents are spending their money. On the other hand, an agent’s deviation in
the Fisher market mechanism can lead to a market equilibrium where the other agents’ spending
and allocation has changed signicantly. In addition to this, in the Fisher market mechanism an
agent can aect the price of an item even if the agent does not end up spending on that item in the
nal outcome. is is in contrast to the Trading Post mechanism where an agent can aect only
the prices of the items that this agent is spending on, so the agents are forced to “put their money
where their mouth is”.
Finally, we prove that the set of mixed Nash equilibria of the Trading Post mechanism coincides
with the set of pure Nash equilibria even with concave valuations, which extends our approxi-
mation bounds for this mechanism to mixed PoA. Moreover, both mechanisms achieve a classic
notion of individual fairness in the equilibrium, namely proportionality. All of the above results
work for the weighted version of the Nash social welfare, where agent i has awi fraction of the to-
tal budget, and the NSW objective becomes Πi [ui (x)]
wi . In the process of obtaining a near optimal
bound for Leontief in the Trading Post mechanism, we show that ϵ-approximate market equilibria
for Leontief utilities approximate its Nash social welfare by a factor of 1
(1+ϵ ) . We believe that this
as well as the technique that we developed to show the bounds of 2 may be of independent interest.
1.2 Related Work
e paper most closely related to our work is that of [Cole et al., 2013a] which proposes truthful
mechanisms for approximately maximizing the Nash social welfare objective. One of the truthful
mechanisms that they propose, the Partial Allocation mechanism, guarantees a 2.718 approxima-
tion of the optimal NSW for both linear and Leontief valuations. In fact, the Partial Allocation
mechanism guarantees that every agent receives a 2.718 approximation of the value that it would
receive in the market equilibrium. But, in order to ensure truthfulness, this mechanism is forced
to keep some of the goods unallocated, which makes it inapplicable for many real world seings.
Complementing this mechanism, our work analyzes simple and well-studied mechanisms that al-
locate everything.
Most of the literature on fair division starting from the 1940’s deals with the cake-cuing prob-
lem, whichmodels the allocation of a divisible heterogeneous resource such as land, time, and min-
eral deposits, among agents with dierent preferences [Barbanel, 2004, Brams and Taylor, 1996,
Moulin, 2003, Robertson and Webb, 1998, Young, 1995]. Some recent work has studied the agents’
incentives in cake cuing. In particular, [Chen et al., 2013] study truthful cake-cuing with agents
having piecewise uniform valuations and provide a polynomial-time mechanism that is truthful,
proportional, and envy-free, while [Mossel and Tamuz, 2010] shows that for general valuations
there exists a protocol that is truthful in expectation, envy-free, and proportional for any number
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of players. e work of [Maya and Nisan, 2012] shows that truthfulness comes at a signicant cost
in terms of eciency for direct revelation mechanisms, while [Braˆnzei and Miltersen, 2015] show
that the only strategyproof mechanisms in the standard query model for cake cuing are dicta-
torships (even for two players; a similar impossiblity holds for n > 2). e standard cake cuing
model assumes additive valuations, and so it does not capture resources with Leontief valuations,
which we also analyze in this paper.
e resource allocation literature has seen a resurgence of work studying fair and ecient al-
location for Leontief valuations [Dolev et al., 2012, Ghodsi et al., 2011, Gutman and Nisan, 2012,
Parkes et al., 2012]. ese valuations exhibit perfect complements and they are considered to be
natural valuation abstractions for computing seings where jobs need resources in xed ratios.
[Ghodsi et al., 2011] dened the notion of Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), which is a general-
ization of the egalitarian social welfare to multiple types of resources. is solution has the advan-
tage that it can be implemented truthfully for this specic class of valuations. [Parkes et al., 2012]
assessed DRF in terms of the resulting eciency, showing that it performs poorly. [Dolev et al.,
2012] proposed an alternate fairness criterion called Boleneck Based Fairness, which was subse-
quently showed by [Gutman and Nisan, 2012] to be satised by the proportionally fair allocation.
[Gutman and Nisan, 2012] also posed the study of incentives related to this laer notion as an
interesting open problem. It is worth noting that [Ghodsi et al., 2011] acknowledge that the CEEI,
i.e., the NSW maximizing allocation would actually be the preferred fair division mechanism in
their seing, and that the main drawback of this solution is the fact that it cannot be implemented
truthfully. Our results show that the Trading Post mechanism can, in fact, approximate the CEEI
outcome arbitrarily well, thus shedding new light on this seing.
e Trading Post mechanism, also known as the Shapley-Shubik game [Shapley and Shubik,
1977], has been studied in an extensive body of literature over the years, sometimes under very
dierent names, such as Chinese auction [Matros, 2007], proportional sharingmechanism (see, e.g.,
[Feldman et al., 2009]), and the Tullock contest in rent seeking [Fang, 2002, Moldovanu and Sela,
2001, Tullock, 1980], the laer being a variant of the game with a dierent success probability
for items that nobody bid on. Trading Post can also be interpreted as a congestion game (see,
e.g., [Georgiou et al., 2006]), or an all-pay auction when the budgets are intrinsically valuable to
the players.
e fact that, facing the Fisher mechanism, the agents may gain by bidding strategically is well
known. [Adsul et al., 2010] studied the agents’ incentives and proved existence and structural prop-
erties of Nash equilibria for this mechanism. Extending this work, [Chen et al., 2012, 2011] proved
bounds on the extent to which an agent can gain by misreporting for various classes of valuation
functions, including additive and Leontief. Finally, [Braˆnzei et al., 2014] showed bounds for the
price of anarchy of this mechanismwith respect to the social welfare objective, and [Cole and Tao,
2016] studied large markets under mild randomness and showed that this price of anarchy con-
verges to one.
Finally, recent work on the NSW has revealed additional appealing properties of this objec-
tive. For indivisible items the NSW can be approximated in polynomial time [Anari et al., 2016,
Anari et al., 2017, Cole et al., 2017, Cole and Gkatzelis, 2015] and its optimal allocation is approxi-
mately envy-free [Caragiannis et al., 2016]. On the other hand, for divisible items, it can be used
as an intermediate step toward approximating the normalized social welfare objective [Cole et al.,
2013b].
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2 PRELIMINARIES
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a set of players (agents) andM = {1, . . . ,m} a set of divisible goods. Player
i’s utility for a bundle of goods is represented by a non-decreasing non-negative concave valuation
function ui : [0, 1]
m → R+. An allocation x is a partition of the goods to the players such that xi, j
represents the amount of good j received by player i . Our goal will be to allocate all the resources
fully; it is without loss of generality to assume that a single unit of each good is available, thus the
set of feasible allocations is F =
{
x | xi, j ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 xi, j = 1
}
.
Our measure for assessing the quality of an allocation is its Nash social welfare. At a given
allocation x it is dened as follows
NSW(x) =
(
n∏
i=1
ui (xi )
) 1
n
.
In order to also capture situations where the agents may have dierent importance or priority,
such as clout in bargaining scenarios, we also consider the weighted version of the Nash social
welfare objective. Note this is the objective maximized by the Fisher market equilibrium solution
when the buyers have dierent budgets. We slightly abuse notation and refer to the weighted ob-
jective as the Nash social welfare (NSW) as well. If Bi ≥ 1 is the budget of agent i and B =
∑n
i=1 Bi
is the total budget, the induced market equilibrium in Fisher’s model maximizes the objective:
NSW(x) =
(
n∏
i=1
ui (xi )
Bi
) 1
B
.
Note that we get back the original denition when all players have the same budget. We would
like to ndmechanisms that maximize theNSWobjective in the presence of strategic agents whose
goal is to maximize their own utility.
We measure the quality of the mechanisms using the price of anarchy [Nisan et al., 2007] with
respect to the NSW objective. Given a problem instance I and some mechanism M that yields
a set of pure Nash equilibria E, the price of anarchy (PoA) of M for I is the maximum ratio
between the optimal NSW—obtained at some allocation x∗—and the NSW at an allocation x ∈ E:
PoA(M, I) = maxx∈E
{
NSW(x∗)
NSW(x)
}
. e price of anarchy ofM is the maximum of this value over all
possible instances: maxI{PoA(M,I)}.
Valuation Functions. We start with two very common and extensively studied valuation func-
tions that lie at the two extremes of a spectrum: perfect substitutes and perfect complements. For
both, let vi = (vi,1, . . . ,vi,m) ∈ R
m
+
be a vector of valuations for agent i , where vi, j captures the
liking of agent i for good j .
Perfect substitutes, dened mathematically through linear (additive) valuations, represent goods
that can replace each other in consumption, such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola. In the additive model,
the utility of a player i for bundle xi is ui (xi ) =
∑m
j=1 vi, j · xi, j .
Perfect complements, represented by Leontief utilities, capture scenarios where one good may
have no value without the other, such as a le and a right shoe, or the CPU time and computer
memory required for the completion of a computing task. In the Leontief model, the utility of a
player i for a bundle xi is ui (xi ) = min
m
j=1
{
xi, j/vi, j
}
; that is, player i desires the items in the ratio
vi,1 : vi,2 : . . . : vi,m. Coecients can be rescaled freely in the Leontief model, so w.l.o.g. vi, j ≥ 1.
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Finally, perfect substitutes and complements are extreme points of a much more general class
of valuations known as CES (constant elasticity of substitution), mathematically dened as
ui (xi ) =
( m∑
j=1
vi j · x
ρ
i j
) 1
ρ
where ρ parameterizes the family, and −∞ < ρ ≤ 1, ρ , 0. e Leontief and additive utilities are
obtained when ρ approaches −∞ and equals 1, respectively.
3 THE FISHER MARKET MECHANISM
In the Fisher market model, given prices p = (p1, . . . ,pm), each buyer i demands a bundle x i that
maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraints; we call this an optimal bundle of buyer i
at prices p. Prices p induce a market equilibrium if buyers get their optimal bundle and market
clears. Formally, prices p and allocation x constitute a market equilibrium if
(1) Optimal bundle: ∀i ∈ N and ∀y : y · p ≤ Bi , ui (xi ) ≥ ui (y)
(2) Market clearing: Each good is fully sold or has price zero, i.e., ∀j ∈ M ,
∑m
j=1 xi, j ≤ 1, and
equality holds if pj > 0. Each buyer exhausts all its budget, i.e., ∀i ∈ N ,
∑m
j=1 xi, jpj = Bi .
For linear and Leontief valuations, the market equilibria can be computed using the Eisenberg-
Gale (EG) convex program formulations that follow.
Linear Leontief
max
∑n
i=1 Bi · logui
s.t. ui =
∑m
j=1 vi, jxi, j ,∀i ∈ N∑n
i=1 xi, j ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ M
xi, j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N , j ∈ M
max
∑n
i=1 Bi · logui
s.t. ui ≤
xi, j
vi, j
, ∀i ∈ N , j ∈ M∑n
i=1 xi, j ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ M
xi, j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N , j ∈ M
(1)
Let pj be the dual variable of the second inequality (for good j) in both cases, which corresponds
to price of good j . Since due to strong duality Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions capture
solutions of the formulations, we get the following characterization for market equilibria.
For linear valuations, an outcome (x,p) is a market equilibrium if and only if,
Lin1 ∀i ∈ N and ∀j ∈ M , xi, j > 0 ⇒
vi, j
pj
= maxk ∈M
vi,k
pk
.
Lin2 ∀i ∈ N ,
∑
j∈M xi, jpj = Bi . ∀j ∈ M , either
∑
i ∈N xi, j = 1 or pj = 0.
For Leontief valuations, an outcome (x,p) is a market equilibrium if and only if.
Leo1 ∀i ∈ N and ∀j ∈ M ,vi, j > 0 ⇒ ui =
xi, j
vi, j
=
Bi∑
j∈M vi, jpj
. Note that
∑
j∈M vi, jpj is the amount
buyer i has to spend to get unit utility.
Leo2 ∀i ∈ N ,
∑
j∈M xi, jpj = Bi . ∀j ∈ M , either
∑
i ∈N xi, j = 1 or pj = 0.
e Fisher market mechanism asks that the agents report their valuations and then it computes
the market equilibrium allocation with respect to the reported valuations using the EG formula-
tions.
Denition 3.1 (Fisher Market Mechanism). e Fisher Market Mechanism is such that:
• e strategy space of each agent i consists of all possible valuations the agent may pose:
Si = {si | si ∈ R
m
≥0}. We refer to an agent’s strategy as a report.
• Given a strategy prole s = (si )
n
i=1, the outcome of the game is a market equilibrium of
the Fisher market given by 〈Bi , si 〉, aer removing the items j for which
∑
i ∈N si (j) = 0. If
there exists a market equilibrium E preferred by all the agents (with respect to their true
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valuations), then E is the outcome of the game on 〈Bi , si 〉. Otherwise, the outcome is any
xed market equilibrium.
It is well known that the buyers have incentives to hide their true valuations in a Fisher market
mechanism. We illustrate this phenomenon through an example.
Example 3.2. Consider a Fisher market with players N = {1, 2}, items M = {1, 2}, additive
valuations v1,1 = 1, v1,2 = 0, v2,1 = v2,2 = 0.5, and budgets equal to 1. If the players are truthful,
the market equilibrium allocation is x1 = (1, 0), x2 = (0, 1). However, if player 2 pretended that its
value for item 2 is a very small v ′2,2 = ϵ > 0, then player 2 would not only get item 2, but also a
fraction of item 1.
In the rest of this section we study the performance of the Fisher mechanism when the goods
are substitutes and complements, respectively.
3.1 Fisher Market: Perfect Substitutes
In this section we study eciency loss in the Fisher market due to strategic agents with additive
valuations. We note that pure Nash equilibria in the induced game are known to always exist due
to [Adsul et al., 2010].2 Our rst main result states that the Fisher market approximates the Nash
Social Welfare within a small constant factor, even when the players are strategic.
Theorem 3.3. e Fisher Market Mechanism with linear valuations has price of anarchy at most
2.
We rst prove a useful lemma, which bounds the change in prices due to a unilateral deviation
in the Fisher market with additive valuations.
Lemma 3.4. Let p be the prices in a Fisher market equilibrium. Suppose that buyer i unilaterally
changes its reported values to v′i , leading to new market equilibrium prices p
′. en,∑
j : p′j>pj
p ′j ≤ Bi +
∑
j : p′j>pj
pj .
Proof. Let M+, M−, and M= be the sets of goods whose prices have strictly increased, strictly
decreased, and remained unchanged, respectively, when transitioning from p to p′. If some player
k , i is buying any fraction of a good from M− or M= at p′, then the player cannot be buying
anything from M+ at p′. To verify this fact, assume that player k was spending on some item
α ∈ M− ∪ M= at prices p and is now spending on some item β ∈ M+ at prices p′. Since both
these allocations are market equilibria, Lin1 implies that
vk,α
pα
≥
vk,β
pβ
at prices p and
vk,α
p′α
≤
vk,β
p′
β
at prices p′. Since p ′α ≤ pα and p
′
β
> pβ , this leads to the contradiction that vk,α > vk,α .
us, any player, other than i , who is buying goods from M+ at prices p′ had to be spending
all its budget on these items at prices p. is implies that the only reason why the sum of the
prices of the goods in M+ could increase is because player i is contributing more money on these
items. Since the budget of i is Bi , the total increase in these prices is at most Bi . is concludes
the proof. 
In addition to this, we will be using a folklore weighted arithmetic and geometric mean inequal-
ity stated in the following lemma.
2e existence is shown under a conict-free tie breaking rule, which tries to allocate best bundle to as many agents as
possible when there is a choice.
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Lemma 3.5. For any nonnegative numbers ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn and w1,w2, . . . ,wn withW =
∑n
i=1wi ,
we have
(∏n
i=1 ρ
wi
i
)1/W
≤
∑n
i=1 ρiwi
W
.
We can now prove the main theorem.
Proof. (ofeorem 3.3) Given a problem instance with additive valuations, let x∗ be the alloca-
tion that maximizes the Nash social welfare—i.e., the market equilibrium allocation with respect
to the true valuations—and x˜ and p˜ the allocation and prices respectively obtained under some
Nash equilibrium of the market, where the players report fake valuations v˜. Additionally, for each
player i , let xi be the allocation that would arise if every player k , i reported v˜k while i reported
its true value vi j for every item j with x
∗
i j > 0, and zero elsewhere.
Since v˜ is an equilibrium, this unilateral deviation of i cannot increase its utility:
ui (x˜i ) ≥ ui (x
i
i ) =
m∑
j=1
x ii jvi j . (2)
Since xi is a market equilibrium with respect to the reported values, according to the KKT
condition (Lin1), x
i
i j > 0 implies vi j/p
i
j ≥ vik/p
i
k
for any other item k , where pij is the price of
item j in xi . Also, the KKT condition (Lin2) imply that
∑
j x
i
i jp
i
j = Bi for every bidder i . erefore,
xii provides i at least as much value as any other bundle that i can aord facing prices p
i , i.e., any
bundle that costs at most Bi . In particular, consider the allocation x
′ such that
x ′i j =
Bix
∗
i j∑m
k=1 x
∗
ik
pi
k
.
For this allocation we have:
m∑
j=1
x ′i jp
i
j =
m∑
j=1
(
Bix
∗
i j∑m
k=1 x
∗
ik
pi
k
)
· pij =
Bi
∑m
j=1 x
∗
i jp
i
j∑m
k=1 x
∗
ik
pi
k
= Bi .
erefore, player i can aord this bundle of items using the budget Bi , which implies that x
i
i
provides i at least as much value, i.e.,
ui (x
i
i ) ≥ ui (x
′
i ) =
m∑
j=1
vi, jx
′
i, j =
Biui (x
∗
i )∑m
j=1 x
∗
i, jp
i
j
.
Let ρi denote the ratio
ui (x
∗)
ui (x˜i )
. Using the Nash equilibrium inequality (2), we get:
ui (x˜i ) ≥
Biui (x
∗
i )∑m
j=1 x
∗
i, jp
i
j
⇒
ui (x
∗)
ui (x˜i )
≤
∑m
j=1 x
∗
i, jp
i
j
Bi
⇒ ρiBi ≤
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp
i
j .
Using Lemma 3.4, we get:
ρiBi ≤
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp
i
j ≤
∑
j : p ij ≤p˜j
x∗i, jp˜j +
∑
j : p ij >p˜j
x∗i, jp
i
j ≤ Bi +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j ,
and summing over all players:
n∑
i=1
ρiBi ≤
n∑
i=1
(
Bi +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j
)
≤ 2B. (3)
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Substituting Bi forwi in Lemma 3.5 and using Inequality (3) yields:(
n∏
i=1
ρ
Bi
i
)1/B
≤
∑n
i=1 ρiBi
B
≤ 2.

Next we show a lower bound for the price of anarchy of the Fisher mechanism. We construct a
collection of problem instances whose PoA goes to e1/e as number of players grows.
Theorem 3.6. e Fisher Market mechanism with additive valuations has a price of anarchy no
beer than e1/e ≈ 1.445.
Given some value of n, we construct a market with n + 2 agents and n + 1 goods. Fix an integer
k ≤ n; we will set its value later. Each player i ≤ k likes only good i , i.e., vi,i = 1 and all other
vi, j = 0. On the other hand, every agent i ∈ [k + 1,n], apart from having vi,i = 1, also has some
small, but positive, value vi, j = ϵ for all items j ≤ k . e rest of that agent’s vi, j values are zero.
Agent n + 1 has a small but positive value ϵ ′ for goods j ∈ [k + 1,n] and value 2 for good n + 1.
Finally, agent n + 2 values only good n + 1 at value 2. Here ϵ << ϵ ′, and we will set their values
later. In the allocation where every agent i ∈ [1,n] gets all of good i , while agents n + 1 and n + 2
share good n + 1 equally, the NSW is equal to 1. Next, we construct a Nash equilibrium strategy
prole s of the above market where the NSW approaches (1/e)1/e as n →∞.
We dene a strategy prole s where the rst k agents and the last agent, i.e., agent n + 2, bid
truthfully, while every bidder i ∈ [k+1,n]misreports in a way such that it ends up spending some
small amount δ = 2ϵ ′ on item i and the rest of its budget, namely (1 − δ ), is equally divided on
items in [1,k]. We later set a value for δ such that agent n + 1 would want to buy only good n + 1.
We now show that the above prole is a Nash equilibrium for carefully chosen values of ϵ , and
ϵ ′. Note that, since bidders i ∈ [1,k] and bidder n+ 2 bids truthfully and values just one item, each
one of these bidders will spend all of its budget on the corresponding items, no maer what the
remaining bidders report. erefore, the price of items j ∈ [1,k] and item n + 1 will be exactly 1
if we exclude the spending of bidders i ∈ [k + 1,n + 1], no maer what these bidders report. Also,
if the price of items j ∈ [k + 1,n] is equal to δ in prole s, then this price will not drop below δ ,
irrespective of what bidder n + 1 reports. In the next two lemmas, we show that a deviation from
s does not help the bidders, even when the prices are held constant for the goods where an agent
starts spending more money.
Lemma 3.7. If δ = 2ϵ ′ then, even if the prices of goods j ∈ [k + 1,n] are xed at δ , the (n + 1)th
bidder has no incentive to spend money on any good other than good n + 1.
Proof. If agent n + 1 spends all of its budget on item n + 1, then its price becomes 2 and the
agent receives half of that item, i.e., a utility of 1. On the other hand, if the agent spends at total of
γ > 0 on goods j ∈ [k + 1,n] then, even if the price of these items remains δ , her utility would be
ϵ ′
γ
δ + 2
1−γ
2−γ . For this to be strictly greater than 1 we have to have δ < 2ϵ
′ − γϵ ′, which contradicts
our assumption that δ = 2ϵ ′. 
Furthermore, using a similar analysis as that of Lemma 3.7, it follows that if agent i ∈ [k + 1,n]
deviates in a way that decreases its spending on good i to 2ϵ ′−τ for τ > 0, then the Fisher market
mechanism outcome will have the (n + 1)th agent spending at least τ1+ϵ ′ on that item. us, such
a deviation would cause agent i to lose its monopoly on good i . Next, we show that this is not
advantageous for agent i if we set ϵ = 1
n4
and ϵ ′ = 1
n
, which implies δ = 2
n
.
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Lemma 3.8. For any τ ≥ 0, if agent i is spending δ −τ on good i and agent (n + 1) is spending τ1+ϵ ′ ,
when others are bidding according to s, then agent i’s utility is maximized at τ = 0.
Proof. Note that at τ = 0, agent i ∈ [k + 1,n] is spending δ = 2ϵ ′ on good i and, according
to Lemma 3.7, agent n + 1 would not be interested in spending on good i . us, agent i is buying
good i exclusively and spends 1−δ
k
on each of the rst k goods. us the price each one of the rst
k goods is 1 + (n − k) 1−δ
k
. Agent i’s utility at this allocation is
1 +
1−δ
k
1 + (n − k) 1−δ
k
kϵ = 1 +
(1 − δ )kϵ
k + (n − k)(1 − δ )
As mentioned above, if agent i reduces spending on good i by τ , then the (n + 1)th agent will
end up spending at least τ1+ϵ ′ on this item. is may lead to increased prices for the rst k goods,
but we show that this deviation would not benet i even if these prices remained the same. e
utility of agent i aer such a deviation would be
δ − τ
δ − τ + τ1+ϵ ′
+
(1 − δ + τ )kϵ
k + (n − k)(1 − δ )
e laer utility is greater than the former only when
τkϵ
k + (n − k)(1 − δ )
>
τ
1+ϵ ′
δ − τ + τ1+ϵ ′
⇒ ϵ >
k + (n − k)(1 − δ )
k(δ + δϵ ′ − τϵ ′)
> 1,
which contradicts the fact that ϵ = 1
n4
. 
Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8 imply that s is a Nash equilibrium. e price of the rst k goods at this
Nash equilibrium is 1 +
(n−k)(1−δ )
k =
k+(n−k)(1−δ )
k . us, the utility of buyer i ∈ [1,k], who spends
all of its $1 on good i , is ui =
k
k+(n−k)(1−δ ) . On the other hand, the utility of buyer i ∈ [k + 1,n],
who gets all of good i and some of the rst k goods, is ui = 1 +
(1−δ )kϵ
k+(n−k)(1−δ )
. Agents (n + 1) and
(n + 2) get half of good n + 1 and thereby get utility of 1 each. Since ϵ = 1
n4
and ϵ ′ = 1n , then
∀i ∈ [1,k], limn→∞ ui =
k
n
and ∀i ∈ [k + 1,n] limn→∞ ui = 1. us, NSW at this bid prole
as n → ∞ is (kn )
k
n , and thereby PoA is at least (nk )
k/n . Leing k = ne , this becomes e
1/e , which
concludes the proof of eorem 3.6.
3.2 Fisher Market: Perfect Complements
On the other hand, the Fisher market with perfect complements has a price of anarchy that grows
linearly with the number of players.
Theorem 3.9. e Fisher Market Mechanism with Leontief valuations has a price of anarchy of n,
the number of players, and the bound is tight.
Remark. We observe that PoA of Fisher Market Mechanism degrades continuously within CES
as we move from additive to Leontief. For the complements range, i.e., ρ < 0, the example achiev-
ing n lower bound for Leontief can be modied to show that as ρ decreases the PoA increases. e
modication is in the Nash equilibrium prole, where agent i reports vi,i = 1 + ϵ instead of 1 for
an appropriately chosen ϵ ≥ 0 depending on ρ and number of players n.
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4 THE TRADING POST MECHANISM
e important dierence between the Trading Post mechanism and the Fisher Market mechanism
is the strategy space of the agents. More precisely, unlike the Fisher market mechanism, where the
agents’ are asked to report their valuations, the Trading Post mechanism instead asks the agents
to directly choose how to distribute their budgets. Once the agents have chosen howmuch of their
budget to spend on each of the goods, the total spending on each good j is treated as its price, and
each agent i is allocated a fraction of good j proportional to the amount that i is spending on j .
erefore, the strategy set of each player i is Si =
{
bi ∈ [0,Bi ]
m |
∑m
j=1 bi, j = Bi
}
.
Given a bid prole b = (b1, . . . , bn), the induced allocation is:
xi, j =
{
bi, j∑n
k=1 bk, j
if bi, j > 0
0 otherwise
In this section we analyze Trading Post for additive and Leontief valuations, extending a number
of results to CES and arbitrary concave functions under amild technical condition known as perfect
competition, which states that for each good j , there exist at least two buyers that demand strictly
positive amount of j when the good is priced at zero. For additive and Leontief valuations, the
condition is equivalent to vi, j > 0,vk, j > 0, for some i,k ∈ N , i , k . If this were not satised, we
could either discard the good or give it away for free.
Our main results in this section are that the pure Nash equilibria of Trading Post approximate
the NSW objective within a factor of 2 for linear valuations, and within a factor of 1 + ϵ for every
ϵ > 0 for Leontief valuations. In fact we extend the approximation factor of 2 to CES and more
generally to concave utilities. Moreover, in all of these cases, all the Nash equilibria of the game
are pure and their existence is guaranteed for CES utilities.
4.1 Trading Post: Perfect Substitutes
e existence of pure Nash equilibria in the Trading Post mechanism for additive valuations was
established by Feldman, Lai, and Zhang [Feldman et al., 2009] under perfect competition. Without
competition, even very simple games may not have pure Nash equilibria. To see this, consider for
instance a game with two players, two items, and additive valuations v1,1 = 1, v1,2 = 0, v2,1 =
v2,2 = 0.5. rough a case analysis it can be seen that both players will compete for item 1, while
player 2 is the only one that wants item 2, reason for which this player will successively reduce its
bid for 2 to get a higher fraction from item 1. However, in the limit of its bid for the second item
going to zero, player 2 loses the item.
Our rst result shows that Trading Post matches the Fisher market for additive valuations.
Theorem 4.1. e Trading Post Mechanism with linear valuations has price of anarchy at most 2.
Proof. Given a problem instance with linear valuations, let x∗ be the allocation that maximizes
the NSW and p∗ be the corresponding market equilibrium prices. Also, let x˜ be the allocation in a
Nash equilibrium where each player i bids b˜i and the price of each item j is p˜j =
∑
i b˜i, j .
For some player i , let x′ be the allocation that arises if every player k , i bids b˜k while agent
i unilaterally deviates to b ′i, j for each item j . In this deviation, player i rst withdraws all of its
money, leaving the price of item j to be p ′j = p˜j − b˜i, j , and then it redistributes it by spending b
′
i, j
on each item j . e perfect competition condition ensures that, once player i withdraws its money,
the prices remain positive (p ′j > 0, ∀j), as at least two agents are interested in each good. Let the
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new bid b ′i, j be such that for some βi > 0 and every item j:
b ′i, j
p ′j + b
′
i, j
=
x∗i, j
βi
. (4)
Bid b′i is implied by the solution of the following program.
min: βi s.t.:
1
βi
=
b ′i, j
x∗i, j(p
′
j + b
′
i, j )
and b ′i, j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ M ;
∑
j∈M
b ′i, j ≤ Bi
Seing b ′i, j = 0 and βi = ∞ gives a feasible point in the above program, and therefore it has
a minimum. e allocation induced by this unilateral deviation of i is x ′i, j =
b ′i, j
p′j+b
′
i, j
=
x ∗i, j
βi
.
erefore, the utility of player i aer this deviation is ui (x
∗)/βi . But the outcome x˜ is a Nash equi-
librium, so this deviation cannot yield a higher utility for i , which implies that ui (x˜) ≥ ui (x
∗)/βi .
By denition of b ′, we get
∑
j b
′
i, j =
∑
j x
′
i, j(p
′
j + b
′
i, j) = Bi ; all the money is spent at optimum βi .
erefore, replacing for x ′i, j = x
∗
i, j/βi , we get
Biβi =
m∑
j=1
x∗i, j (p
′
j + b
′
i, j) (5)
Since 0 ≤ x∗i, j ≤ 1 and p
′
j ≤ p˜j for each item j , for agent i we have,
m∑
j=1
x∗i, j (p
′
j + b
′
i, j) ≤
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jb
′
i, j +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j ≤ Bi +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j . (6)
Using Inequalities (5) and (6), and summing over all players gives
n∑
i=1
Bi
ui (x
∗
i )
ui (x˜i )
≤
n∑
i=1
Biβi ≤
n∑
i=1
(
Bi +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j
)
≤ 2B. (7)
Using the inequality of weighted arithmetic and geometric means provided by Lemma 3.5 on
βi ’s of (7), we conclude that
∏n
i=1
(
ui (x
∗
i )
ui (x˜i )
)Bi /B
=
∏n
i=1 (βi )
Bi /B ≤ 2. 
e next theorem complements the upper bound on the price of anarchy with a lower bound of
approximately 1.445.
Theorem 4.2. e Trading Post mechanism has a price of anarchy no beer than e1/e ≈ 1.445.
Proof. In order to prove this theorem we can use the same family of problem instances used in
the proof of eorem 3.6. In fact, verifying that the market equilibrium outcome induced by the
strategy prole s in that construction is a Nash equilibrium for the Trading Post mechanism as well
is much more straightforward since an agent’s deviation may aect only the way that particular
agent ends up spending its budget. 
eupper and lower bounds of Trading Post with additive valuations given byeorems 4.1 and
4.2 are same as that of Fisher market mechanism. However, next we show this symmetry breaks
as soon as we move away from additive valuations, and Trading Post fares signicantly beer.
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4.2 Trading Post: Perfect Complements
We rst characterize the precise conditions under which the Trading Post mechanism has exact
pure Nash equilibria for Leontief utilities; the missing proofs of this section may be found in the
full version [Branzei et al., 2017].
Theorem 4.3. e Trading Post mechanism with Leontief utilities has pure Nash equilibria if and
only if the corresponding market equilibrium prices are all strictly positive. When this happens, the
Nash equilibrium utilities in Trading Post are unique and the price of anarchy is 1.
is theorem shows a correspondence between the pure Nash equilibria of Trading Post and the
correspondingmarket equilibria with respect to the agents’ (true) valuations. We observe however
that existence of pure Nash equilibria in Trading Post is not guaranteed for Leontief utilities.
Example 4.4. Consider a game with two players and two items, where player 1 has valuesv1,1 =
v1,2 = 0.5 and player 2 has v2,1 = 0.9, v2,2 = 0.1. Assume there is a pure Nash equilibrium prole
b. Since both players require a non-zero amount from every item for their utility to be positive,
we have that bi, j > 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Denote b1 = b1,1 and b2 = b2,1; then b1,2 = 1 − b1 and
b2,1 = 1 − b2. Note that each player must receive the two items in the same ratio relative to its
valuation; that is:
ui (b) =
(
bi
b1 + b2
)
1
vi,1
=
(
1 − bi
b1 + b2
)
1
vi,2
(8)
Otherwise, if the two ratios were not equal, then a player could transfer weight among the items to
improve the smaller fraction. en the requirement in 8 are equivalent to the following equations:(
b1
b1 + b2
)
1
0.5
=
(
1 − b1
b1 + b2
)
1
0.5
⇐⇒ b1 = b2 (9)
and (
b2
b1 + b2
)
1
0.9
=
(
1 − b2
b1 + b2
)
1
0.1
⇐⇒ 8b22 + 8b1b2 = 9b1 + 7b2 (10)
Combining equations 9 and 10, we get that b1 = 1 and b2 = 1, which contradicts the requirement
that b1,b2 ∈ (0, 1). us the equilibrium prole b cannot exist.
e issue illustrated by this example is that the Trading Post cannot implementmarket outcomes
when there exist items priced at zero in the corresponding market equilibrium. is motivates us
to introduce an entrance fee in the Trading Post mechanism, denoted by a parameter ∆ > 0, which
is the minimum amount that an agent needs to spend on an item in order to receive any of it. We
denote the corresponding mechanism by TP(∆). e value of ∆ can be arbitrarily small, so its
impact on the outcome of the game is insignicant.
Formally, given a bid prole b = (b1, . . . , bn), let b = (b1, . . . , bn) be the “eective” bid prole
which, for every i ∈ N and j ∈ M , satises bi, j = bi, j if bi, j ≥ ∆, and bi, j = 0 otherwise. en, the
bid prole b yields the allocation:
xi, j =
bi, j∑n
k=1 bk, j
if bi, j > 0, and xi, j = 0 otherwise
Clearly, in any Nash equilibrium, we have that for every player i and item j we have that bi, j ≥ ∆
or bi, j = 0 (the laer identity holds for those goods j that are outside of player i’s demand).
e main result of this section is that, for every ϵ ∈ (0, 1/m), the Trading Post mechanism with
∆ ≤ ϵ/m2 has a price of anarchy of at most 1 + ϵ . We rst show that Trading Post has a pure
Nash equilibrium for Leontief utilities for every strictly positive entrance fee. e proof uses an
application of Glicksberg’s theorem for continuous games.
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Theorem 4.5. e parameterized Trading Post mechanism TP(∆) is guaranteed to have a pure
Nash equilibrium for every ∆ > 0.
We start by dening a notion of approximate market equilibrium that will be useful
Denition 4.6 (ϵ-market equilibrium). Given a problem instance and some ϵ > 0, an outcome
(p, x) is an ϵ-market equilibrium if and only if: (i)All the goodswith a positive price are completely
sold. (ii) All the buyers exhaust their budget. (iii) Each buyer gets an ϵ-optimal bundle at prices
p; that is, for every bundle y ∈ [0, 1]m that i could aord at these prices (p · y ≤ Bi ), we have
ui (y) ≤ ui (xi )(1 + ϵ).
e following theorem states that for every small enough ϵ > 0, all the PNE of the Trading Post
game with a small enough entrance fee correspond to ϵ-market equilibrium outcomes.
Theorem 4.7. Let ϵ > 0. en for every 0 < ∆ < min
{
ϵ
m2
, 1m
}
, every pure Nash equilibrium of
the mechanism TP(∆) with Leontief valuations corresponds to an ϵ-market equilibrium.
Proof. Let b˜ be a pure Nash equilibrium of TP(∆) and x the induced allocation. For each
player i , let Di = {j ∈ M | vi, j > 0} be the set of items that i requires, and letmi = |Di |. We also
override notation and refer to ui (b) as the utility of player i when the strategy proles are b.
First note that b˜i, j > 0 for each player i and item j ∈ Di . If this were not the case, then
player i would get zero utility at strategy prole b˜; this is worse than playing the uniform strategy
zi = (Bi/m, . . . ,Bi/m), which guarantees i a positive value regardless of the strategies of the other
players b˜−i , namely:
ui (zi , b˜−i ) = min
j∈Di
{
zi, j
zi, j +
∑
k,i b˜k, j
·
1
vi, j
}
≥ min
j∈Di
{
Bi/m
Bi/m +
∑
k,i Bk
·
1
vi, j
}
> 0
For each player i and item j ∈ Di , denote the fraction of utility that i derives from j by:
ϕi, j =
b˜i, j∑n
k=1 b˜k, j
·
1
vi, j
.
en ui (b˜) = minj∈Di ϕi, j . Sort the items in Di increasingly by their contribution to i’s utility:
ϕi,i1 ≤ ϕi,i2 ≤ . . . ≤ ϕi,imi ; it follows that ui (b˜) = ϕi,i1 . Let Si = {j ∈ Di | ϕi, j = ϕi,i1} be the items
received in the smallest fraction (equal to i’s utility). If Si = M , then the analysis is similar to the
exact equilibrium case, where the prices are strictly positive. e dicult case is when Si , M .
en player i is geing a higher than necessary fraction from some resource j ∈ M \ Si . us i
would improve by shiing some of the mass from item j to the items in S . Since b˜ is an equilibrium,
no such deviation is possible. en it must be the case that b˜i, j = ∆ for all j ∈ Di \ Si .
Now interpret the bids and allocation as a market equilibrium with Leontief utilities v and bud-
gets Bi , by seing the prices to p = (p1, . . . ,pm), where pj =
∑n
i=1 b˜i, j for all j ∈ M , and the
allocation to x, the same as the one induced by the bids b˜ in the trading post game. We argue
that (p, x) is an ϵ-market equilibrium. Clearly at the outcome (p, x) all the goods are sold and each
buyer exhausts their budget. Moreover observe that all the prices are strictly positive. We must
additionally show that each player gets an ϵ-optimal bundle at (p, x).
Fix an arbitrary buyer i . Let yi be an optimal bundle for i given prices p, and let qi, j be the
amount of money spent by i to purchase yi, j units of good j at these prices. An upper bound on
the optimal value ui (yi ) is aained when buyer i shis all the money spent on purchasing items
outside Si to purchase instead higher fractions from the items in Si . Since the strategy prole b is
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an exact equilibrium in the game TP(∆), the amount of money spent by player i on items outside
Si is at most (m − 1)∆; thus i spends at most Bi − (m − 1)∆ on the remaining items in Si .
By an averaging argument, there exists a good j ∈ Si on which i spends the greatest amount of
its money, i.e.
b˜i, j ≥
Bi − (m − 1)∆
|Si |
.
is will be the item for which the gain brought by the deviation in spending is modest. Formally,
the maximum fraction of utility that i can get from item j—without decreasing the ratios at which
the other items in Si are received—is:
ϕ ′i, j =
qi, j
pj · vi, j
≤
b˜i, j + (m − 1)∆(∑n
k=1 b˜k, j
)
· vi, j
= ϕi, j +
(m − 1)∆(∑n
k=1 b˜k, j
)
· vi, j
≤ ϕi, j +
b˜i, j · ϵ(∑n
k=1 b˜k, j
)
· vi, j
= ϕi, j · (1 + ϵ) = ui (xi )(1 + ϵ)
where in the inequalities we additionally used that ∆ < ϵ2/m, Bi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ N , and Si ≤ m − 1.
e identities hold since item j is in the tight set Si . en ui (yi ) ≤ ϕ
′
i, j ≤ ui (xi )(1 + ϵ). us each
player gets an ϵ-optimal bundle, and so (p, x) is an ϵ-market equilibrium. 
e following theorem, whichwe believe is of independent interest, states that in Fisher markets
with Leontief utilities, approximate market equilibria are close to exact equilibria in terms of their
Nash Social Welfare.
Theorem 4.8. e Nash social welfare at an ϵ-market equilibrium for Leontief utilities is at least
a 1
(1+ϵ ) factor of the optimal Nash social welfare.
Finally, we can state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.9. For every ϵ > 0, the Trading Post game TP(∆) with entrance fee 0 < ∆ <
min
{
ϵ 2
m
, 1
m
}
has a price of anarchy of 1 + ϵ , even for arbitrary budgets.
Proof. By eorem 4.7, every PNE of TP(∆) corresponds to an ϵ-market equilibrium. By
eorem 4.8, every ϵ-market equilibrium aains at least a fraction 11+ϵ of the optimal Nash social
welfare. us, the price of anarchy of TP(∆) is 1 + ϵ , which completes the proof. 
4.3 Trading Post: Beyond Perfect Substitutes and Complements
In general market equilibrium theory the valuations of the agents are considered to be arbitrary
concave, non-decreasing and non-negative functions. Nextwe extend the upper bound of 2 achieved
byTrading Post to this most general seing. emissing proofs are in the full version [Branzei et al.,
2017].
Theorem 4.10. e Trading Post game with concave valuations has price of anarchy at most 2.
Moreover, the existence of pure Nash equilibria holds for all CES utilities.
Theorem 4.11. e Trading Post game with no minimum bid has exact pure Nash equilibria for
all CES utilities with perfect competition and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1].
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4.4 Trading Post: Beyond Pure Nash Equilibria
A natural remaining question is whether there exist mixed Nash equilibria with bad Nash social
welfare. In the case of Trading Post mechanism we rule out this case by showing that all its Nash
equilibria are pure, be it for linear, Leontief, or concave valuations. Details of this result may be
found in the full version [Branzei et al., 2017], where we show the following theorem.
Theorem 4.12. For markets with linear utilities, every Nash equilibrium of the corresponding Trad-
ing Post game is pure. Further, the result extends to concave valuations if a mild condition of enough
competition is satised . For markets with Leontief utilities, every Nash equilibrium of the corre-
sponding ∆ Trading Post game TP(∆), for ∆ > 0, is pure.
Given such an eciency achieved by Trading Post mechanism one may wonder if these mech-
anisms in-fact have unique equilibrium. We rule this out through constructions for additive and
Leontief valuations, given in the full version [Branzei et al., 2017].
5 FAIRNESS GUARANTEES
Finally, for concave utilities all the Nash equilibria of the two mechanisms satisfy an important
notion of fairness: proportionality. at is, each player i gets a fraction of at least Bi/B of its
maximum utility (in any Nash equilibrium). For equal budgets, the guarantee is 1/n.
Theorem 5.1. Every Nash equilibrium of the Fisher market mechanism with concave utilities, and
of the Trading Post mechanism with concave and strictly increasing utilities is proportional. Moreover,
for every 0 < ∆ < 1/m, every Nash equilibrium of the parameterized Trading Post game TP(∆)
with concave and strictly increasing utilities is approximately proportional, guaranteeing at least
Bi
B
(1 − ρi ) of the optimum for each player i , where ρi =
∆ ·(m−1)
Bi
, Bi is the player’s budget, B the sum
of budgets, andm the number of items.
6 DISCUSSION
Our results show great dierences between the Fisher market mechanism and Trading Post, with
Trading Post simultaneously achieving a Nash social welfare within a factor of two of the opti-
mum and fairness (in the form of proportionality) for all concave utilities. Existence of pure Nash
equilibria in Trading Post is guaranteed for all CES utilities.
Our most unexpected and important contribution is for Leontief utilities, where Trading Post
approximates the NSW arbitrarily close, while still guaranteeing fair outcomes to each individual.
is result may have implications beyond theory, since Leontief utilities have played a starring role
in the emerging literature on allocating computer resources. One of the most inuential papers
in this literature [Ghodsi et al., 2011] suggested that the NSW maximizing outcome would be the
ideal solution, its only drawback being the fact that it cannot be reached in the presence of strategic
participants.
An interesting open question is that of achieving good approximations of the NSW objective
using truthful, but non-wasteful, mechanisms.
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A FISHER MARKET: PERFECT COMPLEMENTS
Theorem 3.9 (restated): e Fisher Market Mechanism with Leontief valuations has a price of anar-
chy of n and the bound is tight.
Proof. Our tool is the following theorem, which states that Fisher markets with Leontief utili-
ties have Nash equilibria where players copy each others strategies.
Lemma A.1 ([Braˆnzei et al., 2014]). e Fisher Market mechanism with Leontief preferences al-
ways has a Nash equilibrium where every buyer reports the uniform valuation (1/m, . . . , 1/m).
For completeness, we include the worst case example. Consider an instance with n players of
equal budgets (Bi = 1) and n items, where each player i likes item i and nothing else; that is,
vi,i = 1, for all i ∈ N andvi, j = 0,∀i ∈ N ,∀j , i . en the optimal Nash Social Welfare is obtained
in the Fisher market equilibrium, where the price of each item j is pj = 1 and the allocation is
xi,i = 1,∀i ∈ N and xi, j = 0,∀i ∈ N ,∀j , i .
However, the strategy prole y = (y1, . . . , yn), where yi = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) is a Nash equilibrium
in which each player i gets a fraction of 1/n from every item, yielding utility 1/n for every player.
It follows that the price of anarchy is n.
For a general upper bound, we note that any Nash equilibrium must be proportional, i.e. each
player i gets a fraction of at least Bi/B of its best possible utility, OPTi . Let (p, x) be a Nash
equilibrium of the market, achieved under some reports v′. Suppose for a contradiction that there
exists player i with ui (xi ) < Bi/B · OPTi . en if i reported instead its true valuation vi , the
new market equilibrium, (p′, x′), achieved under valuations (vi , v
′
−i ), should satisfy the inequality
ui (x
′
i ) ≥ Bi/B ·OPTi . If this were not the case, the outcome would not be a market (vi , v
′
−i ), since
i can aord the bundle y = (B1/B, . . . ,Bm/B):
p(y) =
m∑
j=1
pj ·
Bi
B
=
Bi
B
·
m∑
j=1
pj = Bi , (11)
Moreover,ui (y) = Bi/B·OPTi , which together with Identity 11 contradicts themarket equilibrium
property of (p′, x′). us in any Nash equilibrium (p, x) we have that ui (xi ) ≥ Bi/B · OPTi , and
so the Nash Social Welfare is NSW(x) ≥
∏n
i=1
(
Bi
B
· OPTi
) Bi
B
. en the price of anarchy can be
bounded as follows:
PoA ≤
n∏
i=1
OPT
Bi /B
i(
Bi
B
· OPTi
)Bi /B ≤
n∏
i=1
(
B
Bi
Bi /B
)
≤
∑n
i=1 Bi ·
(
B
Bi
)
B
= n,
where for the last inequality we used the fact that the weighted geometric mean is bounded by the
weighted arithmetic mean (Lemma 3.5).is completes the proof of the theorem. 
B TRADING POST: PERFECT COMPLEMENTS
Theorem 4.3 (restated) : e Trading Post mechanism with Leontief utilities has exact pure Nash
equilibria if and only if the corresponding Fisher market has market equilibrium prices that are strictly
positive everywhere. When this happens, the Nash equilibrium utilities in Trading Post are unique
and the price of anarchy is 1.
Proof. Suppose (v,B) are valuations and budgets for which the Fisher market equilibrium
prices are strictly positive everywhere (recall also that the valuations satisfy perfect competition).
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en we show that some pure Nash equilibrium exists in the Trading Post game with the same
valuations and budgets, and which induces the same allocation.
Let (p, x) be the Fisher market equilibrium prices and allocation. Dene matrix of bids b by
bi, j = pj · xi, j , for all i ∈ N , j ∈ M . We claim that b is a pure Nash equilibrium in the Trading Post
game. From the conditions in the theorem statement, we have that for each item j , there are two
players i , i ′ such that bi, j · bi ′, j > 0. Also the utility of each player i in the market equilibrium is
the same as that of strategy prole b and can be wrien as follows:
ui (xi ) = min
j∈M :vi, j >0
{
xi, j
vi, j
}
By denition of the market equilibrium, each player i gets each item in its demand set in the same
fraction fi , that is
fi =
xi, j
vi, j
, for j ∈ M with vi, j > 0
en player i can only improve its utility by taking weight from some item(s) and shiing it to-
wards others in its demand. However, since all the items are received in the same fraction fi , it
follows that player i can only decrease its utility by such deviations. us the prole b is a pure
Nash equilibrium of Trading Post.
For the other direction, if a bid prole b is a pure Nash equilibrium in the Trading Post game, then
consider the market allocation and prices (x, p), where pj =
∑n
k=1 bk, j and the induced allocation
x be given by xi, j =
bi, j∑n
k=1 bk, j
. From the perfect competition requirement, clearly xi, j is always well
dened. en at (x, p) all the goods are allocated, all the money is spent, and each player gets an
optimal bundle from its desired goods. To see the laer, note again that a player receives all the
items in the same fractions at (x, p) and since all the prices are positive (since on each item there
are at least two non-zero bids), then a player cannot decrease its spending on any item(s). us
(x, p) is a market equilibrium and since the market equilibrium utilities are unique, it follows that
the same is true for the PNE of Trading Post.
From the correspondence between the Nash equilibria of Trading Post and the market equilibria
of the Fisher mechanism, we obtain that on such instances the price of anarchy is 1. 
Theorem 4.5 (restated) : e parameterized Trading Post mechanism TP(∆) is guaranteed to have
a pure Nash equilibrium for every ∆ > 0.
Proof. Let TP(∆) be the Trading Post game with minimum fee ∆. We rst show that a variant
of the game, TP ′(∆), where the strategy space of each player i is restricted as follows, must have
a pure Nash equilibrium.
• i is forced to bid at least ∆ on every item j with the property that vi, j > 0
• i must bid zero on every item j for which vi, j = 0.
Clearly, the strategy space Si of each player i is a nonempty compact convex subset of a Eu-
clidean space. Moreover, the utility function of each player is continuous in x and quasi-concave
in the player’s own strategy (see, e.g. [Cambini and Martein, 2009], chapter 2).
We use the following theorem due to Debreu, Glicksberg, and Fan.
Lemma B.1. (Debreu [Debreu, 1952]; Glicksberg [Glicksberg, 1952]; Fan 1952) Consider a strategic
form game whose strategy spaces Si are nonempty compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. If
the payo functions ui are continuous in s and quasi-concave in si , then there exists a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
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e conditions of Lemma B.1 apply and so TP ′(∆) has a pure Nash equilibrium b∗. Consider
now the Trading Post game with minimum bid ∆, TP(∆). Note the strategy prole b∗ dominates
every other strategy in TP(∆), including those that allow the players to bid zero on items of
interest to them, since such strategies can only decrease utility. us b∗ is also a PNE in TP(∆),
which completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.8 (restated): e Nash social welfare at an ϵ-market equilibrium for Leontief utilities
is at least a 1
(1+ϵ ) factor of the optimal Nash social welfare.
Proof. For any given problem instance, let (p′,x ′) be an ϵ-market equilibrium and let (p∗,x∗) be
exact market equilibrium prices and allocation. By abuse of notation let ui (p
′) denote the optimal
utility player i can obtain at prices p ′, i.e., ui (p
′) = max {ui (y) | y ≥ 0; p
′ · y ≤ Bi }.
For Leontief utility functions, convex formulation of (1) captures the market equilibrium alloca-
tion. Note that, in order to get a utility of 1 at prices p, agent i would need to spend a total amount
of money equal to ϕi (p) =
∑
j vi jpj . [Devanur, 2009] derived the dual of this convex program:
min :
∑
j pj −
∑
i Bi log(ϕ(p)) +
∑
i Bi log(Bi ) −
∑
i Bi
s .t . ∀j : pj ≥ 0
Note that the term (
∑
i Bi log(Bi )−
∑
i Bi ) is a constant for a given market since Bi s are constants,
and hence is omied in [Devanur, 2009]. Since (p∗,x∗) is a market equilibrium, using strong duality
and the fact that agents spend all their money at equilibrium, i.e.,
∑
j p
∗
j =
∑
i Bi :∑
i
Bi log(ui (x
∗
i )) = −
∑
i
Bi log(ϕ(p
∗)) +
∑
i
Bi log(Bi ) (12)
Furthermore, at the ϵ-market equilibrium (x ′,p ′) all the agents spend all their money, implying∑
j p
′
j =
∑
i Bi . Since p
′ is a feasible dual solution,
−
∑
i
Bi log(ϕ(p
∗)) +
∑
i
Bi log(Bi ) ≤ −
∑
i
Bi log(ϕ(p
′)) +
∑
i
Bi log(Bi ).
Substituting the le hand side using Equation (12), and taking an antilogarithm on both sides yields
∏
i
ui (x
∗
i )
Bi ≤
∏
i
(
Bi
ϕ(p′)
)Bi
. (13)
Since the optimal utility that agent i gets at pricesp ′ isui (p
′), which she derives using Bi money,
and while for unit utility she needs ϕ(p′) money, we get
∀i : ui (p
′) =
Bi
ϕ(p′)
(14)
Since (x ′,p′) is an ϵ-market equilibrium, each agent gets an ϵ-optimal bundle, so ui (p
′) ≤
ui (x
′
i )(1 + ϵ). According to (14), this implies
Bi
ϕ (p′) ≤ ui (x
′
i )(1 + ϵ), which combined with (13)
gives: ∏
i
ui (x
∗
i )
Bi ≤
∏
i
(
Bi
ϕ(p′)
)mi
≤ (1 + ϵ)B
∏
i
ui (x
′
i )
Bi
Since the Nash social welfare at x is (Πiui (xi )
Bi )
1
B , the result follows. 
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C TRADING POST: BEYOND PERFECT SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS
In this section we prove upper bound of 2 on PoA for Trading Post mechanism with arbitrary con-
cave, non-decreasing valuation function and existence of pure Nash equilibria for CES functions.
e proof for PoA bound is similar in structure to that of additive valuations.
Theorem 4.10 (restated): e Trading Post Mechanism with concave valuations has price of anar-
chy at most 2.
Proof. Given a problem instance with concave valuations, let x∗ be the allocation that maxi-
mizes the Nash social welfare subject to supply constraints. Also, let x˜ be the allocation obtained
under a Nash equilibrium where each player i bids b˜i and the price of each item j is p˜j =
∑
i b˜i, j .
For any given player i , let x′ be the allocation that arises if every player k , i bids b˜k while
agent i unilaterally deviates to b′i . ink of this deviation as player i rst withdraw all its money,
leaving price of item j to be p ′j = p˜j − b˜i, j , and then spending b
′
i, j . Perfect competition condition
ensures p ′j > 0, ∀j , as at least two agents are interested in each good. Let the new bid b
′
i, j be such
that for some βi > 0 and every item j .
b ′i, j
p ′j + b
′
i, j
=
x∗i, j
βi
. (15)
Bid b′i is implied by the solution of the following program.
min: βi s.t.:
1
βi
=
b ′i, j
x∗i, j(p
′
j + b
′
i, j )
and b ′i, j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ M ;
∑
j∈M
b ′i, j ≤ Bi
Note that, b ′i, j = 0, ∀j and βi = ∞ is a feasible point in the above program, and therefore it has
a minimum. e allocation induced by this unilateral deviation of i is
x ′i, j =
b ′i, j
p ′j + b
′
i, j
=
x∗i, j
βi
.
If βi ≥ 1, the utility of player i aer this deviation is ui
(
x∗i
βi
)
≥ ui (x
∗)/βi , due to the concavity
of ui . If, on the other hand, βi < 1, then ui
(
x∗i
βi
)
≥ ui (x
∗) (non-decreasing). erefore, ui
(
x∗i
βi
)
≥
ui (x
∗)/max{1, βi }. But, x˜ is a Nash equilibrium, so this deviation of player i cannot yield a higher
utility for i , which implies that
ui (x˜) ≥ ui
(
x∗i
βi
)
⇒
ui (x
∗)
ui (x˜)
≤ max{1, βi }. (16)
By denition of b ′, we get
∑
j b
′
i, j =
∑
j x
′
i, j(p
′
j + b
′
i, j) = Bi ; all the money is spent at minimum βi .
erefore, replacing for x ′i, j = x
∗
i, j/βi , we get
Biβi =
m∑
j=1
x∗i, j (p
′
j + b
′
i, j) (17)
Also, we have 0 ≤ x∗i, j ≤ 1, and p
′
j ≤ p˜j for every item j . As a result, for each player i we have,
m∑
j=1
x∗i, j(p
′
j + b
′
i, j) ≤
m∑
j=1
(x∗i, jp˜j ) +
m∑
j=1
(x∗i, jb
′
i, j) ≤
m∑
j=1
b ′i, j +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j ≤ Bi +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j . (18)
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Let Nд ⊆ N be the set of players for which βi ≥ 1, and Nℓ be the set of players with βi < 1.
Using Inequalities (16), (17), and (18), and summing over all players gives
n∑
i=1
Bi
ui (x
∗
i )
ui (x˜i )
≤
n∑
i=1
Bi max{1, βi } ≤
∑
i ∈Nℓ
Bi +
∑
i ∈Nд
(
Bi +
m∑
j=1
x∗i, jp˜j
)
≤ 2B. (19)
Using Equation 19 and the inequality of weighted arithmetic and geometric means provided by
Lemma 3.5, we conclude that (∏
i ∈N
(
ui (x
∗
i )
ui (x˜i )
)Bi )1/B
≤ 2.

Theorem 4.11 (restated): e Trading Post game with no minimum bid has exact pure Nash
equilibria for all CES utilities with perfect competition and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1].
Proof. e proof for ρ = 0 follows from the existence of Nash equilibria in Fisher markets
with Cobb-Douglas utilities [Braˆnzei et al., 2014], for which the induced allocations are also pro-
portional. us we assume ρ , 0.
Ourmain tool for proving the existence of exact pure Nash equilibria is a result for discontinuous
games due to [Reny, 1999]. First, we dene the beer-reply secure property of a gamewith strategy
space S = S1 × . . . × Sn and utilities ui .
Denition C.1. Player i can secure a payo of α ∈ R at s ∈ S if there exists s¯i ∈ Si , such that
ui (s¯i , s
′
−i ) ≥ α for all s
′
−i close enough to s−i .
Denition C.2. A gameG = (Si ,ui )
n
i=1 is beer-reply secure if whenever (s
∗,u∗) is in the closure
of the graph of its vector payo function and s∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then some player i can
secure a payo strictly above u∗i at s
∗.
Lemma C.3 (Reny, 1999). If each Si is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a metric space, and
each ui (s1, . . . , sn) is quasi-concave in si , then the game G = (Si ,ui )
n
i=1 has at least one pure Nash
equilibrium if in addition G is beer-reply secure.
e strategy spaces in Trading Post are nonempty, convex, compact subsets of the Euclidean
space. Moreover the CES utility functions are quasi-concave for every parameter ρ ≤ 1. We show
the game is also beer-reply secure.
First note that Trading Post has discontinuities at strategy proles where everyone bids zero on
some item, captured by the set
D = {b ∈ S | ∃ j ∈ M such that bi, j = 0,∀i ∈ N }.
Let (b∗, u∗) be a point in the closure of the graph of the vector payo function. If b∗ < D, then
beer-reply security holds at (b∗, u∗) by continuity. us we consider b∗ ∈ D. en there exists
a sequence of strategy proles (bK )K ≥1 such that u
∗
= limK→∞(u1(b
K ), . . ., un(b
K )), where b∗ =
limK→∞ b
K .
Consider the set of items on which no player bids at b∗: J = {j ∈ M | b∗i, j = 0,∀i ∈ N } and ℓ an
item in J . Denote byC the set of players i withvi, ℓ > 0 and BC =
∑
i ∈C Bi . By perfect competition,
|C | > 1, and so there exists player i and value 0 < α < 1− BiBC such that i gets a fraction of at most
f = BiBC + α < 1 from item ℓ in every K
th term of the sequence, possibly except the rst Kα terms.
Take the set of items that player i declares valuable in the limit:
Li = {j ∈ M | b
∗
i, j > 0}.
Simina Braˆnzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Ruta Mehta 25
Given 0 < ϵ < mini, j b
∗
i, j , construct an alternative prole b
′
i (ϵ) of player i , at which the bid on
item ℓ is b ′
i, ℓ
(ϵ) = ϵ , the bid on items j ∈ Li is b
′
i, j(ϵ) = b
∗
i, j − ϵ/|Li |, and the bid on items outside
Li ∪ {ℓ} is b
′
i, j(ϵ) = b
∗
i, j = 0. e strategy b
′
i (ϵ) guarantees that player i gains the entire item ℓ,
while along the sequence (bK )K ≥Kα the player was receiving a fraction of at most f < 1 from ℓ.
Moreover, by playing b ′i, j(ϵ), player i loses a fraction of at most ϵ/w
∗ from every other item j ∈ Li ,
where w∗ = minj∈Li
∑n
k=1 b
∗
k, j
. For CES utilities with ρ > −∞, there exists small enough ϵ such
that ui (b
′
i (ϵ), b
∗
−i ) > u
∗
i . Note that u
∗
i > ui (b
∗), since player i loses item ℓ at b∗.
Moreover, by continuity of the utilities at (b′i (ϵ), b
∗
−i ), the strategy b
′
i (ϵ) continues to guarantee
player i a payo strictly above u∗i for any small enough perturbation of magnitude bounded by
δ (ϵ) of the strategies of the others around b∗−i . us the game is beer-reply secure, which by
Lemma C.3 implies the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. 
Remark. We observe that the existence result may be extended to markets with strictly concave
functions with some additional derivative conditions for specic directions. ese conditions es-
sentially ensure strict increase in the utility of an agent when she starts geing much more of a
good, while the amounts of other goods she gets are decreased by close to zero quantity.
D BEYOND PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA IN TRADING POST
In this section we show that all Nash equilibria of the trading post game are pure. For this we
will show that no maer what other players play, there is a unique pure best response strategy
for player i . At Nash equilibrium, since strategy of a player is a probability distribution over pure
strategies that are in best response, this will imply that every Nash equilibrium has to be pure.
To show uniqueness of best response we will show that xing mixed strategy/bid prole for
all other players, player i’s utility is a strictly concave function of its own bid prole. Let σ−i =
(σ 1, . . . ,σ i−1,σ i+1, . . . ,σn) be a mixed-strategy prole of all the players except i , and let player i’s
payo function w.r.t. σ−i be denoted by u
σ−i
i : Si → R, where Si = {(si1, . . . , sim) ≥ 0 |
∑
j si j =
Bi } is the set of pure strategies (bids) of player i , i.e., set of all possible ways in which she can split
her budget across goods.
Next we derive the result for both additive and Leontief separately, and later extend it to concave
under a mild assumption. Recall that we have assumed perfect competition where every good is
liked by at least two players, which translates to for each good j , there exist i , k ∈ N such that
vi, j , 0,vk, j , 0 for markets with additive or Leontief valuations.
D.1 Perfect Substitutes (Additive valuations)
Function u
σ−i
i is as follows for the case of additive utilities.
u
σ−i
i (si ) =
∑
s−i ∈S−i
(Πk,iσ i (sk ))
∑
j
vi j
si j
si j +
∑
k,i sk j
, ∀si ∈ Si (20)
Next we will show that function u
σ−i
i is strictly concave on the entire domain of R
m , therefore
it is strictly concave on Si as well. For this, we will show that Hessian of u
σ−i
i is negative denite.
Lemma D.1. Given a mixed-strategy prole σ−i of all players k , i such that every good is bought
by at least one of them with non-zero probability, payo function of player i , namely u
σ−i
i , is strictly
concave.
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Proof. We rst show that u
σ−i
i is strictly concave on R+
m . Take the derivative of u
σ−i
i with
respect to si j for each j ,
∂u
σ−i
i
∂si j
=
∑
s−i ∈S−i
(Πk,iσ i (sk ))vi j
∑
k,i sk j
(si j +
∑
k,i sk j )
2
Dierentiating the above w.r.t. siдs for each good д, we get:
∂2u
σ−i
i
∂si j∂siд
= 0, ∀д , j;
∂2u
σ−i
i
∂s2i j
= −2
∑
s−i ∈S−i
(Πk,iσ i (sk ))vi j
∑
k,i sk j
(si j +
∑
k,i sk j )
3
Since bids are non-negative and at least one player other than i is bidding on good j with non-
zero probability as per σ−i , the second term in above expression is strictly negative. erefore, the
hessian is diagonal matrix with negative entries in diagonal, and hence negative denite. us,
function u
σ−i
i is strictly concave on R
m . erefore it remains strictly concave on convex subset
Si ⊂ R
m as well. 
Strict concavity of u
σ−i
i established in Lemma D.11 implies that every player has a unique best
response against any strategy of the opponents and it is pure. At Nash equilibrium since only
strategies in best response can have non-zero probability, it follows that all Nash equilibria have
to be pure. us we get the next theorem.
Theorem D.2. In a market with linear utilities, every Nash equilibrium of the corresponding trad-
ing post game is pure.
Proof. At any given strategy prole, if only player i is biding on a good j with non-zero prob-
ability, then it can not be Nash equilibrium since that i can reduce its bid on good j to very small
amount while still geing it fully, and use this saved money to buy other goods. 
We observe that the equilibria of Trading Post with linear utilities are not necessarily unique.
Example D.3. Consider a market with four buyers and two goods. Players 1 and 2 only want
the rst and second good, respectively, while players 3 and 4 like both goods equally. en the bid
proles s1 = (1, 0), s2(0, 1), s3 = (1 − ϵ, ϵ), s4 = (ϵ, 1 − ϵ) are in NE for any 0 ≤ ϵ ≤ 1.
D.2 Perfect Complements (Leontief utilities)
In case of Leontief utilities, the payo of player i is minj
xi j
vi j
, where xi j is the amount of good j
player i gets. Like the linear case, for Leontief valuations too we will show uniqueness of best
response, however the approach is dierent because the utility function u
σ−i
i (dened below) is
no more strictly concave.
u
σ−i
i (si ) =
∑
s−i ∈S−i
(Πk,iσ i (sk ))min
j
1
vi j
si j
si j +
∑
k,i sk j
, ∀si ∈ Si (21)
We can show that u
σ−i
i is concave using the concavity of
si j
si j+
∑
k,i sk j
w.r.t. si j , however it is not
strictly concave in general. Instead we will show that function u
σ−i
i has a unique optimum over
all the possible strategies of player i in gameTP(∆). is will suce to show that all equilibria are
pure.
Since every good is liked by at least two players, relevant bid proles s−i are only those where
every good is bid on by some player k other than i since bidding zero fetches zero amount of the
good. To capture this we we dene valid strategy proles.
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Denition D.4. Prole s−i is valid if ∀j,
∑
k,i sk j > 0. Similarly, mixed-proles σ−i is said to be
valid if each pure prole s−i with P(s−i ) = Πk,iσk (sk ) > 0 is valid.
Lemma D.5. If σ is a Nash equilibrium of game TP(∆) for any ∆ > 0, then prole σ−i is valid for
each i ∈ A.
Proof. For some i if σ−i is not valid, then there exists s−i with P(s−i ) > 0 and good j such that
no one is bidding on it at s−i . Let k , i is an player with vk j > 0. Clearly she gets zero utility
whenever she plays sk . Instead if she replaces sk with t where tj = ∆, tj′ = sk j′−∆where sk j′ ≥ 2∆
(assuming ∆ to be small there is such a good), and td = skd ,∀d , j, j
′, will give her strictly beer
utility. 
Due to Lemma D.5 it suce to consider only valid strategy proles, both mixed as well as pure.
Lemma D.6. Given a valid strategy prole s−i of TP(∆) for ∆ > 0 and good j , consider function
fj =
1
vi j
si j
si j+
∑
k,i sk j
. fj seen as a function of si j is strictly concave, and as a function of (si1, . . . , sin)
it is concave.
Proof. Taking double derivative of fj we get,
∂2fj
∂s2i j
=
−2
vi j
∑
k,i sk j
(si j+
∑
k,i sk j )
3
∀д , j,
∂2fj
∂si j ∂siд
= 0 and
∂2fj
∂s2iд
= 0
First equality implies strict concavity w.r.t. si j since
∑
k,i sk j ≥ ∆ > 0 given that there is another
player who would want good j . Both equalities together imply that Hessian of fj is negative semi-
denite and there by concavity w.r.t. si . 
Next we show uniqueness of best response for player i against any given σ−i . For simplicity,
we will abuse notation and use ui (si , s−i ) to denote ui (
si,1∑
k sk,1
, . . . ,
si,n∑
k sk,n
)
Lemma D.7. Given a valid mixed-strategy prole σ−i of all players k , i in trading post game
TP(∆) for any ∆ > 0, payo function of player i , namely u
σ−i
i , has a unique optimum.
Proof. First it is easy to see using Lemma D.6 that each of the term inside summation of u
σ−i
i
is a concave function w.r.t. si , since minimum of a set of concave functions is a concave function.
And by the same argument u
σ−i
i itself is concave because it is summation of a set of concave
functions.
To the contrary suppose there are two optimum si , s
′
i ∈ Si , si , s
′
i . Clearly
∑
j si j =
∑
j s
′
i j =mi .
erefore, there exists a good where bid at s is more than that at s ′. Let j∗ ∈ {j | si j > s
′
i j }. Clearly,
si j∗ > ∆.
Claim 1. Given s, if there is a good j with si j > ∆ > 0 and ui (si , s−i ) <
1
vi j
si j∑
k,i sk j+si j
, then si is
not a best response to s−i .
Proof. It is easy to see that there exists δ , such that for tj = si j − nδ ≥ ∆, tk = sik + δ , ∀д , j ,
we have ui (s) < ui (t , s−i ). 
∀s−i with P(s−i ) > 0 if we have ui (si , s−i ) <
1
vi j∗
si j∗∑
k,i sk j+si j∗
, then from the above claim it
follows that si is not an optimal solution of u
σ−i
i .
Otherwise for some s−i we haveui (si , s−i ) =
1
vi j∗
si j∗∑
k,i sk j+si j∗
. Due to concavity ofu
σ−i
i we have
that entire line-segment from si to s
′
i is optimal. Call this line segment L. On this line-segment
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bid on good j is strictly changing (decreasing). Since ui (si , s−i ) = minj
1
vi j
si j∑
k,i sk j+si j
is governed
by the utility obtained from good j∗, it is strictly concave on L at si .
Furthermore, at a point if a set of functions are concave and one of them is strictly concave then
their summation is strictly concave. erefore, u
σ−i
i is strictly concave at si on L and hence either
si is not optimum or other points on L are not optimum. In either case we get a contradiction. 
Since at Nash equilibrium only optimal strategies can have non-zero probability, the next theo-
rem follows using Lemmas D.5 and D.7.
Theorem D.8. For market with Leontief utilities, every Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
∆ > 0 trading post game TP(∆) is pure.
e Trading Post game with Leontief valuations does not always have unique PNE, as can be
seen from the next example.
Example D.9. Let there be an instance of Trading Post with players N = {1, 2}, itemsM = {1, 2},
and Leontief valuationsvi, j = 1, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}. en every strategy prole of the formv1,1 = v2,1 =
a, with a ∈ (0, 1) is a pure Nash equilibrium of Trading Post, since both players get the items in
the optimal ratios.
D.3 Beyond Perfect Substitutes and Complements: Concave Valuations
As stated in preliminaries section, valuation function of each player i namely ui : R
m
+
→ R is
concave, non-negative, and non-decreasing in general, where m = |M | is the number of goods
in the market. Atypical assumption on ui is that it is non-satiated [Arrow and Debreu, 1954], i.e.,
ui (x) > ui (y) if x j ≥ yj , ∀j and x j > yj for some j . We assume following stronger notion of perfect
competition.
Enough Competition. For every good j , there are two players k , i , such that ∂ui
∂xi j
(x) and
∂uk
∂xk j
(y) are innity at bundles x,y ∈ Rm
+
if x j = 0 and yj = 0 respectively.
In Trading Post mechanism, since strategy of a player is to specify money bid on each good, for
si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i let us dene
vi (si , s−i ) = vi
(
si,1
si,1 +
∑
k,i sk,1
, . . . ,
si,m
si,m +
∑
k,i sk,m
)
(22)
en, function u
σ−i
i can be wrien as follows.
u
σ−i
i (si ) =
∑
s−i ∈S−i
(Πk,iσ i (sk ))vi (si , s−i ), ∀si ∈ Si (23)
Next we will show that function u
σ−i
i is strictly concave on the entire domain of R
m given that
σ−i is a NE, therefore it is strictly concave on Si as well. For this, rst we show that ui is (strictly)
concave in si .
Lemma D.10. For a xed s−i ∈ S−i , function vi is concave in si , and is strictly concave if s−i
satises
∑
k,i si j > 0,∀j ∈ M .
Proof. We will show a general claim, and then apply it to our seing. Let [m] denote the set
{1, . . . ,m}.
Claim 2. Given concave, non-decreasing, non-satiated function f : Rm
+
→ R, andm single variate
concave functions дi : R+ → R+ for i ∈ [m], composition function f (д1(x1), . . . ,дm(xm)) is concave.
Further if either f or all дi ’s are strictly concave then f (д1(x1), . . . ,дm(xm)) is strictly concave.
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Proof. Let x,y ∈ Rm
+
, and x ′ and y ′ be such that x ′i = дi (xi ) and y
′
i = дi (yi ) for all i ∈ [m].
Let λ ∈ (0, 1) be a constant and z = λx + (1 − λ)y, then by concavity of дi ’s we get дi (zi ) ≥
λx ′i + (1 − λ)y
′
i ,∀i ∈ [m]. Using this we get,
λf (д1(x1), . . . ,дm(xm)) + (1 − λ)f (д1(y1), . . . ,дm(ym))
= λf (x ′) + (1 − λ)f (y ′)
≤ f (λx ′ + (1 − λ)y′) (∵ f is concave)
≤ f (д1(z1), . . . ,дm(zm)) (∵ дi s are concave and f is non-decreasing)
Above, second inequality become strict if f is strictly concave, and the third inequality becomes
strict if дi ’s are strictly concave due to f being non-satiated. 
For our purpose, set f = vi which is concave, non-decreasing, and non-satiated. Given s−i let
D j =
∑
k,i si j and set дj (si j ) =
si j
si j+D j
, ∀j ∈ M . Clearly, where 00 is considered as 0.
∂дj
∂si j
=
D j
(si j + D j )2
≥ 0,
∂2дj
∂s2i j
=
−2D j
(si j + D j )3
≤ 0
us, дj is concave, and is strictly concave if D j > 0. Since, vi (., si ) = f (д1(si1), . . . ,дm(sim)),
proof follows using the above claim. 
Using the property of vi established in the above lemma, next we will show that Hessian of
u
σ−i
i is negative denite almost always.
Lemma D.11. Given a mixed-strategy proleσ−i of all players k , i such that there is an s
′
−i ∈ S−i
played with positive probability where
∑
k,i s
′
k, j
> 0, ∀j , then payo function of players i , namely
u
σ−i
i , is strictly concave.
Proof. Fix any si ∈ Si , and let H be the Hessian of u
σ−i
i at si . By denition of strictly concave
functions it suces to show thatH is negative denite. LetH (s−i ) be the Hessian of vi (., s−i ) at si
for each s−i ∈ S−i . Let α(si ) = (Πk,iσ i (sk )), then by denition of u
σ−i
i from (23) Hessian of u
σ−i
i
at si is H =
∑
s−i ∈S−i α(si )H (s−i ).
By Lemma D.10 since each of these vi (., s−i ) is concave, H (s−i ) is negative semi-denite. Fur-
thermore, the one with
∑
k,i s
′
k, j
> 0, ∀j and α(s ′−i ) > 0 due to the hypothesis gives strictly
concave vi (., s
′
−i ) (Lemma D.10), and hence H (s
′
−i ) is negative denite. For any x ∈ R
m , we have
xTHx = xT
( ∑
s−i ∈S−i
α(si )H (s−i )
)
x =
∑
s−i ∈S−i
α(si )(x
TH (s−i )x) < 0
e last inequality follows from the fact that xTH (s−i )x ≤ 0, ∀s−i ∈ S−i , and x
TH (s ′−i )x < 0.
By denition of negative denite matrices, the proof follows. 
Using enough competition condition and strict concavity of u
σ−i
i established in Lemma D.11,
next we show the main result.
TheoremD.12. In amarket with concave utilities and enough competition, every Nash equilibrium
of the corresponding trading post game is pure.
Proof. Let σ = (σ 1, . . . ,σn) be a Nash equilibrium prole, and to the contrary suppose it is
mixed. Let i be an player who is playing amixed strategy. AtNash equilibrium since only strategies
in best response can have non-zero probability, there are si , s
′
i ∈ Si such that u
σ−i
i is maximized
at both.
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Due to enough competition for every good j there is an player k , i who always bids on good
j , i.e., ∀sk ∈ Sk with σk (sk ) > 0, we have sk j > 0. erefore, at σ−i every s−i with non-zero
probability satises
∑
k,i sk j > 0, ∀j . Using this Lemma D.10 implies u
σ−i
i is strictly concave and
there by has a unique maximum. A contradiction to both si and s
′
i being maximizer of u
σ−i
i . 
E FAIRNESS GUARANTEES
Theorem 5.1 (restated): Every Nash equilibrium of the
• Fisher market mechanism with concave utilities
• Trading Post mechanism with concave and strictly increasing utilities
is weighted proportional. Moreover, for every 0 < ∆ < 1/m, every Nash equilibrium of the pa-
rameterized Trading Post game TP(∆) with concave and strictly increasing utilities is approximately
proportional, guaranteeing at least Bi
B
(1 − ρi ) of the optimum for each player i , where ρi =
∆ ·(m−1)
Bi
,
Bi is the player’s budget, B the sum of budgets, andm the number of items.
Proof. We consider rst the Fisher market. Let u be the true utilities of the players and u∗ a
pure Nash equilibrium of the market. Given a bundle x, denote by ui (x) the (true) utility of player
i when receiving x. Given utilities w, denote by ui (w) the (true) utility of player i for the Fisher
market equilibrium allocation obtained when the players declare w as their utilities.
A strategy that is always available to player i when facing u∗−i is its true valuation, ui . Since
u∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium, ui (u
∗
i , u
∗
−i ) ≥ ui (ui , u
∗
−i ). Moreover, player i can always aord to
purchase the bundle Bi
B
· 1, which consists of a fraction of Bi
B
of each good j . When i is honest,
the market equilibrium allocation must give a bundle worth at least as much as Bi
B
· 1, and so
ui (ui , u
∗
−i ) ≥ ui (
Bi
B
· 1). Since the utilities are concave and non-negative, we have that ui (
Bi
B
· 1) ≥
Bi
B
· ui (1). By combining the previous inequalities, we get
ui (u
∗) ≥ ui (ui , u
∗
−i ) ≥ ui
(
Bi
B
· 1
)
≥
Bi
B
· ui (1)
For Trading Post, we rst show that the PNE of the gamewith nominimum bid achieveweighted
proportionality when the utilities are concave and strictly increasing. Note that for valuations such
as Leontief, Nash equilibria exist only when the corresponding Fisher market prices are strictly
positive; we handle these cases later through the parameterized game.
Recall that for Trading Post we normalize the budgets such that Bi ≥ 1. Let b˜ be a PNE strategy
prole. For any player i , let D j =
∑
k,i b˜k, j be the sum of bids from the other players at good j .
We wish to argue that player i has a “safe” strategy that guarantees it a fraction of Bi/B from each
good. Dene strategy y = (y1, . . . ,ym) of player i , such that yj =
Bi ·D j
B−Bi
. for each item j . Since the
utilities are strictly monotonic, it follows that in any PNE we haveD j > 0 (since otherwise a player
could gain by halving its bid on item j , still win the item, and increase the fractions from other
items), and so yj > 0 for all j . It can be veried that
∑m
j=1 yj = Bi and that the fraction received by
player i from every good j is:
yj
yj + D j
=
(
Bi ·D j
B−Bi
)
(
Bi ·D j
B−Bi
)
+ D j
=
Bi · D j
Bi · D j + D j · (B − Bi )
=
Bi
B
.
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us y is a safe strategy that guarantees player i a fraction of Bi/B of every good. Since b˜ is a
PNE, strategy y is not an improvement, which together with concavity of the utilities gives:
ui (b˜) ≥ ui (y, b˜−i ) ≥ ui
(
Bi
B
· 1
)
≥
Bi
B
· ui (1).
Consider now the parameterized Trading Post game. For any 0 < ∆ < 1/m, let b˜ be a PNE
strategy prole and the quantities D j and y as dened above. Let Si = {j ∈ [m] | yj < ∆} be the
set of items on which the safe strategy y is below the minimum bid. Note it cannot be the case
that |Si | = m since ∆ < 1/m,
∑
j yj = Bi , and Bi ≥ 1, thus |Si | ≤ m − 1. Let B
′
i = Bi − ∆ · |Si | and
dene a modied strategy prole z = (z1, . . . , zm) for player i :
zj =
{
∆, if j ∈ Si
B′i ·D j
B−B′i
, otherwise
We show rst that the strategy z is feasible, by not exceeding i’s budget:
m∑
j=1
zj = ∆ · |Si | +
∑
j<Si
zj = ∆ · |Si | +
∑
j<Si
B′i · D j
B − B′i
= ∆ · |Si | +
(
Bi − ∆ · |Si |
B − Bi + ∆ · |Si |
)
·
(∑
j<Si
D j
)
≤ ∆ · |Si | +
(
Bi − ∆ · |Si |
B − Bi + ∆ · |Si |
)
· (B − Bi ) ≤ Bi
Clearly for each item j ∈ Si , player i receives a fraction of at least Bi/B—this fraction was guaran-
teed at the bid yj , and zj = ∆ > yj . From the items j < Si , player i gets a fraction of:
zj
zj + D j
=
(
B′i ·D j
B−B′i
)
(
B′i ·D j
B−B′i
)
+ D j
=
B′i
B
=
Bi − ∆ · |Si |
B
≥
Bi − ∆ · (m − 1)
B
=
Bi
B
(
1 −
∆ · (m − 1)
Bi
)
Let ρi =
∆ ·(m−1)
Bi
. By concavity and strict monotonicity, we have:
ui (b˜) ≥ ui (z, b˜−i ) ≥ ui
(
Bi
B
(1 − ρi ) · 1
)
≥
Bi
B
(1 − ρi ) · ui (1)
Also note the fraction converges to Bi/B as ∆ → 0. is completes the proof. 
